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Comment
Interlocutory Appeals in New York-Time
Has Come for a More Efficient Approach
I. Introduction
In New York, a party may appeal, by right, almost any civil
interlocutory order.' This extreme position makes New York
one of the most liberal jurisdictions in the United States. 2
Many commentators argue that in order to supervise the lower
courts effectively, the appellate division must have broad juris-
diction over interlocutory orders.3
1. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 5701(a)(2) (McKinney 1978). An interlocutory order
is an order which decides not the cause, but only settles some intervening matter
relating to it or affords some temporary relief. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1096 (6th
ed. 1990). Interlocutory orders deal solely with matters at the pre-trial stage.
2. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 268 (1957) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (citing N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 609 as an "extreme example"). See also Mot-
tolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J., dissenting)
(mentioning New York allows numerous interlocutory appeals by right). In sharp
contrast to New York, the federal system allows only a select number of interlocu-
tory orders to be appealed immediately. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1993). The limited
number of interlocutory appeals is a result of Congress' strict adherence to the
final judgment rule. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.1 (2d ed.
1993) [hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL] (stating the final judgment rule precludes any
appeal until after all the issues involved in a particular lawsuit have been finally
determined by the trial court). In recent times, however, Congress has deviated
from the final judgment rule, allowing more interlocutory orders to be appealed.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),(e). See also DAVID D. SIEGAL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 526
(2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter SIEGAL].
3. REPORT OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION TASK FORCE OF 1989, at 36 (1990)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE]. See also Jill Paradise Botler et al., The Appellate Divi-
sion of the Supreme Court of New York: An Empirical Study of Its Powers & Func-
tions as an Intermediate State Court, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 929, 954 (1979)
[hereinafter Botler] (stating "free appealability affords the Appellate Division sub-
stantial opportunity to supervise the trial court and to ensure that its actions are
within permissible legal and discretionary bounds."). See also Francis Bergan, The
Appellate Division at Age 90: Its Conception and Birth, 1894, N.Y. STATE B.J., Jan.
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However, allowing appeals as of right from almost every
kind of interlocutory order increases delay and expense in liti-
gation.4 In addition, it may lead to excessive appellate intru-
sion, demoralizing the trial judge.5 Therefore, New York must
balance the appellate division's need to supervise the lower
courts against the negative consequences that result when par-
ties have the statutory authority to appeal by right almost
every interlocutory order.6
Currently, the appellate division must decide an enormous
number of appeals every year.7 In light of this caseload crisis,
New York must reevaluate its generous approach to interlocu-
tory appeals.8 This Comment discusses how the appellate divi-
sion can deal most efficiently with interlocutory appeals. Part
II describes the history of interlocutory appeals in New York,
since the creation of the appellate division. Part III explains
how other jurisdictions treat interlocutory appeals. Part IV
presents the current caseload crisis in the appellate division.
Part V describes the controversy over unlimited interlocutory
appealability. Part VI evaluates how New York can streamline
its approach without sacrificing the appellate division's ability
to supervise the lower courts. Part VII suggests that a modified
"single justice" approach is the fairest and most efficient solu-
tion. Part VIII concludes that the legislators must take meas-
ures to streamline New York's approach to interlocutory
appeals.
1985, at 7 [hereinafter Bergan] (describing the creation of the Appellate Division
and its role as an intermediate appellate court in New York). There are four appel-
late departments in New York: First Department, Second Department, Third De-
partment, and Fourth Department.
4. ADVISORY COMM. ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN NEW YORK, SECOND PRE-
LIMINARY REPORT, at 116 (1958) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT].
5. Botler, supra note 3, at 954.
6. ROBERT MACCRATE ET AL., APPELLATE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK 87 (1982)
[hereinafter MACCRATE] (stating interlocutory appeals take up a significant
amount of the appellate courts' caseload and they are often used as a delay tactic
disrupting the trial process).
7. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 11 n.15.
8. See generally Botler, supra note 3. See also MACCRATE, supra note 6, at 87.
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II. The History of Interlocutory Appeals in New York
A. Creation of the Appellate Division
In the Constitution of 1894, the New York Legislature cre-
ated the appellate division.9 At that time, the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure ("Code") governed practice in New York.10 Under the
Code, New York deviated substantially from the final judgment
rule." The Code allowed a party to appeal by right numerous
interlocutory orders to the appellate division.1 2 In 1920, the leg-
islature passed the Civil Practice Act ("CPA") replacing the
9. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 7 (1894) (stating the General Term, which was the
existing intermediate appellate court, was reduced to four departments). The leg-
islature intended the appellate division to "absorb many of the functions formerly
exercised by the Court of Appeals and operate as the court of last resort in the
overwhelming majority of cases." See MACCRATE, supra note 6, at 25. See also
Botler, supra note 3, at 940-44 (stating the appellate division was structured to
replace the General Term and in the process remedy many of its inefficiencies and
weaknesses as an intermediate appellate court).
10. Ch. 448, [1876] N.Y. Laws 1 (repealed 1920).
11. Id. Before New York enacted the State Constitution of 1846, the common
law governed New York's appellate procedure. 1 CHARLES Z. ZINSER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK, Vol. 1, at 183 (1906) (citing the N.Y. CONST. art. 35
(1777)). Under the common law, a party could not appeal an interlocutory order
until after the final judgment. Brooks v. Hunt, 17 Johns. Ch. 484, 486-87 (N.Y. Ch.
1820). See also Botler, supra note 3, at 935. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 2, at
§ 13.1, for definition and discussion of the final judgment rule.
12. Ch. 448, § 1347, [1876] N.Y. Laws 260 (repealed 1920) (a party may ap-
peal an interlocutory order to the General Term of the Supreme Court that 1)
grants, refuses, continues, or modifies a provisional remedy; or 2) grants or refuses
a new trial; or 3) involves some part of the merits; or 4) affects a substantial right;
or 5) where it determines the action, preventing a judgment from which an appeal
may be taken; or 6) determines a statutory provision of the state to be
unconstitutional).
3
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Code.' 3 Under the CPA, a party was still entitled to appeal by
right almost any interlocutory order to the appellate division.'4
In 1958, prior to enacting the Civil Practice Law and Rules
("CPLR"),16 the Advisory Committee ("Committee") proposed to
reduce the number of interlocutory orders appealable by right. 6
The Committee believed that "the present New York provisions
allowing appeal as of right from almost every kind of intermedi-
ate determination ... are a prime source of delay and expense
in litigation."' 7 The Committee concluded that section 609 of
the CPA encouraged litigants to take intermediate appeals
rather than appeals from the final judgment."' This was based
on the fact that orders reviewable after final judgment were
limited to those that "necessarily affect the final judgment." 9
13. Ch. 925, § 609, [1920] N.Y. Laws 214-15 (repealed 1962). An order may be
appealed by right:
1) Where the order grants, refuses, continues or modifies a provisional rem-
edy; or settles, or grants, or refuses an application to resettle a case on ap-
peal or a bill of exceptions. 2) Where it grants or refuses a new trial; except
that where specific questions of fact arising upon the issues in an action
triable by the court have been tried by a jury, pursuant to an order for that
purpose, an appeal cannot be taken from an order granting or refusing a
new trial upon the merits. 3) Where it involves some part of the merits. 4)
Where it affects a substantial right. 5) Where, in effect, it determines the
action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken. 6)
Where it determines a statutory provision of the state to be unconstitu-
tional; and the determination appears from the reasons given for the deci-
sion thereupon or is necessarily implied in the decision.
Id.
14. Id.
15. The Civil Practice Law and Rules governs civil practice in New York to-
day. N.Y. Civ. PlAc. L. & R. (McKinney 1991).
16. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 116.
17. Id. See also La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 268 (1957) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (stating New York's broad appealability of interlocutory orders
is extreme in comparison to other American jurisdictions).
18. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 117.
19. Id. N.Y. Civ. PnAc. L. & R. 5501(a) (McKinney 1978) (stating a party may
not appeal after the final judgment an intermediate order that does not necessarily
affect the final judgment). See, e.g., Fox v. Matthiessen, 155 N.Y. 177, 179, 49
N.E.2d 673 (1898) (stating that orders denying motions to set aside verdicts and
requesting a new trial, upon the ground of misconduct of a juror, and an order
denying a motion to resettle such order, both made before judgment on the verdict
has actually been entered, are 'intermediate' orders, affecting the final judgment);
Austrian Lance & Stewart v. Jackson, 50 A.D.2d 735, 736, 375 N.Y.S.2d 868, 870
(1st Dep't 1975) (stating a prior order entered granting partial summary judgment
was a non-final order, which had not been reviewed by the appellate division, could
be reviewed on appeal from the final judgment); Johnson v. International Har-
610
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Because of this restrictive test, a party could not have many
orders reviewed unless he or she appealed them immediately. 20
The Committee came up with a proposal 2' that it believed
was "a realistic compromise between the 'final judgment' rule
prevailing in most American jurisdictions and the present posi-
tion of New York." 22 The Committee proposed to enumerate
those selective orders that are appealable by right.23 With re-
vester Co. of America, 237 A.D. 778, 779, 263 N.Y.S. 262, 264 (3d Dep't 1933) (stat-
ing an intermediate order allowing amendment of complaint to change relief
sought to one in equity to one at law "necessarily affects all the proceedings," and
in equity rendered the trial and the judgment abortive).
20. CoMmrrrEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 117. See, e.g., Two Guys From Harri-
son-NY v. Realty Ass'n, 186 A.D.2d 186, 188, 587 N.Y.S.2d 962, 965 (2d Dep't
1992) (stating "a provisional remedy designed to retain the status quo while the
action was pending" does not necessarily affect the final judgment); Fonda Mfg.
Corp. v. Lincoln Laminating Corp., 72 A.D.2d 522, 522, 420 N.Y.S.2d 904, 905 (1st
Dep't 1979) (stating an order denying joint trials does not necessarily affect the
final judgment); Hirschfield v. Hirschfield, 54 A.D.2d 656, 656, 388 N.Y.S.2d 577,
577 (1st Dep't 1976) (stating "an intermediate order which denied an application to
take depositions in aid of plaintiffs cause of action" does not necessarily affect the
final judgment); Sawdon v. Sawdon, 39 A.D.2d 883, 885, 333 N.Y.S.2d 610, 611 (1st
Dep't 1972) (stating "an order granting temporary alimony does not affect the final
judgment and cannot be reviewed on an appeal from the final judgment."); Dulber
v. Dulber, 37 A.D.2d 566, 566, 322 N.Y.S.2d 862, 862 (2d Dep't 1971) (stating an
order denying a motion to examination before trial is not reviewable upon final
judgment); Collins v. McWilliams, 185 A.D. 712, 712, 173 N.Y.S.2d 850, 851 (1st
Dep't 1919) (stating an order denying a motion for a bill of particulars is not re-
viewable on an appeal from a final judgment because it does not necessarily affect
the final judgment).
21. See infra note 23.
22. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 117. The plan was to specify those
orders that are appealable by right and make all other orders appealable only upon
permission by the trial judge or appellate division. Id. For a discussion of the
"final judgment rule" see infra part III.
23. ComMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 117-18. The proposal provided that:
[An appeal may be taken to the Appellate Division as of right in an action,
or, unless a statute otherwise provides, in a special proceeding, originating
in the supreme court or a county court 2) from an order, where the motion it
decided was made upon notice: i) granting, refusing, continuing or modify-
ing a provisional remedy; or ii) granting or denying a motion for a severance
or consolidation or to add or drop a party; or iii) denying a motion to dismiss
before answer or for summary judgment; or iv) granting a new trial or hear-
ing as to one or more issues after a verdict when there is a right to trial by
jury; or v) denying judgment when the jury is discharged without reaching a
verdict when there is a right to trial by jury; or vi) in effect, determining the
case and preventing a judgment or order from which an appeal may be
taken; or vii) denying a motion to open a default or to vacate a final judg-
ment or order entered on a default; or viii) granting or denying a motion for
relief from or to vacate a final judgment or order on the grounds . . ..
5
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gard to other types of orders, a party may appeal them only
upon permission, if they involve a question of law. 24 Essen-
tially, the Committee enumerated the orders important enough
to be appealed immediately, while introducing a new concept of
permission for other types of orders.25 The Committee's major
modification involved eliminating appeals from orders involving
"some part of the merits" and orders "affecting a substantial
right," because these provisions permitted many unnecessary
appeals. 26
Many individuals, including some segments of the bar,
greatly opposed the Committee's proposal.27 Because of the op-
position, the legislature modified the proposal substantially. 28
The legislature retained the provisions allowing broad appeala-
bility by right.29 However, it adopted the Committee's recom-
mendation, requiring a party to seek permission for certain
interlocutory orders.30
As a result of the above debates, in 1962, the legislature
enacted CPLR 5701.31 CPLR 5701 separates interlocutory or-
ders that may be appealed by right, and those that require per-
mission. 32 The orders that are appealable by right are
Id.
24. Id. at 119. With regard to permission, the proposal stated that:
If a question of law is involved which ought to be reviewed, an appeal may
be taken to the appellate division from an order which is not appealable as
of right in an action or special proceeding originating in the supreme court
or a county court by permission of the judge who made the order granted
before application to the appellate division or by permission of the appellate
division to which the appeal could be taken, upon refusal by the judge who
made the order or upon direct application.
Id.
25. Id. at 117-19.
26. Id. at 120.
27. 7 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 1 5701.03 (1994)
[hereinafter WEINSTEIN].
28. Id. See also SEN. FIN. COMM. REP. OF 1961, at 143 (1961) [hereinafter SEN-
ATE REPORT].
29. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701(a)(2) (McKinney 1978).
30. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701(c).
31. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701. CPLR 5701 is the main statutory source of
the appellate division's jurisdiction. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701 commentary at
573 (McKinney 1978) [hereinafter Commentary]. See also WEINSTEIN, supra note
27, ¶ 5701.04 (stating a party, in the New York state system, may only appeal a
judgment or an order).
32. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701(a)-(c).
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss3/6
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essentially the same types of orders that were appealable under
the CPA.33
B. New York's Approach to Interlocutory Appeals Today34
The appellate division has considerable authority to review
nonfinal orders. 35 This broad appealability of interlocutory or-
ders contrasts sharply with the federal system and most states'
systems.36 A party may invoke seven different provisions that
allow him or her to appeal an interlocutory order by right.37
33. 6TH REPORT LEG. Doc. 1962 No. 8, at 554, 556 (stating interlocutory or-
ders appealable by right under the new CPLR are "substantially the same as pres-
ent section 609 of the Civil Practice Act-which is broader than that of other
American jurisdictions in authorizing immediate appeals . . . ."). For the list of
orders appealable under the CPA, see supra note 13.
34. Because CPLR 5701 deals only with appeals taken from the supreme
court and the county court, this Comment discusses only appeals from these
courts. "Appeals to the Appellate Division from courts of original instance other
than the Supreme Court and County Court are governed by the appropriate
statute applicable to that court." THOMAS R. NEWMAN, NEW YORK APPELLATE
PRACTICE § 1.04[2][a][i] (1991) [hereinafter NEWMAN].
35. Nemeroff Realty Corp. v. Kerr, 38 A.D.2d 437, 439, 330 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634
(2d Dep't 1972) (stating "[tihe Appellate Division has wide power to review nonfi-
nal orders and judgments (see CPLR 5701)."). See also Botler, supra note 3, at 954.
36. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 268 (1957) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (referring to New York's system of interlocutory appellate review as ex-
treme compared to other jurisdictions). See, e.g., ALA. ST. R. 4(a)(1); ALASKA R. OF
APP. PRO. 402(a); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2101 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
115-108 (Michie 1994); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 904.1 (West 1995); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 32 (1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-263 (West 1994); DEL. ST. S. CT. R.
42; D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-322 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 9.130 (West 1995); GA. R. S.
CT. R. 22; HAW. REV. STAT. § 641-1 (1994); IDAHO ST. CT. R. 11; ILL. S. CT. R. 307;
IND. ST. R. 4; IOWA R. 2; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2102 (1993); Ky REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22.020 (Michie 1994); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 1914 (West 1993); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 6 (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. tit. 12, § 12-303
(1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 118 (West 1994); MICH. CT. R. 5.801;
MINN. R. 103.03 (1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-51-79 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 512.020 (Vernon 1993); MONT. ST. CT. R. 1; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21 (1993); NEV.
ST. R. 3A; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498 (1993); N.J. R. A. R. 2:2-4; N.M. ST. CT. R.
12-203; OKLA. CT. R. 1.40; OR. REV. STAT. § 19.010 (1993); PA. ST. CT. R. 311; R.I.
GEN. LAws § 9-24-7 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-3-330 (Law. Co-op. 1993); TENN.
R. OF APP. PRo. 9; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (West 1994); UTAH
CT. R. 5(a); VT. CT. R. 5; VA. CT. R. 5; WASH. CT. R. 2.3 (b)(1)-(3); W. VA. CODE § 58-
5-1 (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 809.50 (West 1994); Wyo. ST. CT. R. 13. But see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-27-02 (1993); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 15-26A-3 (1994).
37. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701(a)(2).
7
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However, a party must seek permission to appeal all other in-
terlocutory orders. 38
1. Provisions Allowing Interlocutory Appeals By Right39
Under the first provision, a party may appeal an order by
right if it grants, refuses, continues, or modifies a provisional
remedy. 40 Provisional remedies include: attachment, 41 prelimi-
nary injunction or temporary restraining order,42 receivership, 43
and notice of pendency.44 The second provision allows a party to
38. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701(b),(c).
39. To appeal an interlocutory order by right, the party's motion, that
culminated in an order, must have been made upon notice to the other party. See
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701(a)(2). Essentially, requiring notice precludes appeal
from an ex parte order. See Commentary, supra note 31, at 575. The way around
appealing an ex parte order is "to move on notice to vacate or set aside the order
and, if this motion is denied, to appeal from the order denying the motion to
vacate." See WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, ¶ 5701.06.
40. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701(a)(2)(i).
41. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 6223 (McKinney 1980). Attachment is defined as
"[tihe legal process of seizing another's property in accordance with a writ or judi-
cial order for purpose of securing satisfaction of a judgment yet to be rendered."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 126 (6th ed. 1990). See, e.g., Mfns. and Traders Trust Co.
v. Lowenstein, 91 A.D.2d 848, 458 N.Y.S.2d 117 (4th Dep't 1982); AMF Inc. v. Algo
Distrib., Ltd., 48 A.D.2d 352, 369 N.Y.S.2d 460 (2d Dep't 1975); Henry Stuart
(Fabrics), Ltd. v. Jules Moskowitz & Co., 44 A.D.2d 798, 355 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1st
Dep't 1974); Hydromar Corp. of Del. v. Constr. Aggregates Corp., 32 A.D.2d 749,
300 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1st Dep't 1969).
42. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 6314 (McKinney 1980). A preliminary injunction
and a temporary restraining order are essentially provisional remedies "to pre-
serve [the] subject matter of controversy pending trial." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY
785 (6th ed. 1990). See, e.g., New York v. Barone, 141 A.D.2d 629, 529 N.Y.S.2d
994 (2d Dep't 1988); Honeywell, Inc. v. Technical Bldg. Serv., Inc., 103 A.D.2d 433,
480 N.Y.S.2d 627 (3d Dep't 1984); Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teach-
ers' Ass'n, 43 A.D.2d 198, 350 N.Y.S.2d 805 (3d Dep't 1974); N.Y. v. Asiatic Petro-
leum Corp., 45 A.D.2d 835, 357 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1st Dep't 1974).
43. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 6401 (McKinney 1980). Receivership is defined as
the "[liegal or equitable proceeding in which a receiver is appointed for an insol-
vent corporation, partnership or individual to preserve its assets for benefit of af-
fected parties." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1269 (6th ed. 1990). See, e.g., Hammond
v. Hammond, 257 A.D. 1041, 13 N.Y.S.2d 870 (4th Dep't 1939); Scott v. Scott, 219
A.D. 451, 220 N.Y.S. 93 (1st Dep't 1927).
44. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 6501 (McKinney 1980). Notice of pendency is "[a]
notice filed on public records for the purpose of warning all persons that the title to
certain property is in litigation, and that they are in danger of being bound by an
adverse judgment." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 932 (6th ed. 1990). See, e.g., L & L
Excavating Corp. v. Abcon Ass'n, Inc., 191 A.D.2d 539, 594 N.Y.S.2d 818 (2d Dep't
1993); Interboro Operating Corp. v. Commonwealth Sec. & Mortgage Corp., 243
A.D. 626, 276 N.Y.S. 687 (2d Dep't 1935).
614
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appeal an order by right if the order settles, grants, or refuses
an application to resettle a transcript or statement on appeal. 45
Under the third provision, a party may appeal an order that
grants or refuses a new trial. 46 A party may invoke the sixth
provision when the order determines the action and prevents a
judgment from which an appeal might be taken.47 Under the
seventh provision, a party may appeal an order that determines
a statutory provision of the state to be unconstitutional.4 8
These five provisions are rarely invoked because in essence all
appealable interlocutory orders fall within provision four (in-
45. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701(a)(2)(ii). "[R1esettlement of an order or de-
cree is merely the exercise of the inherent authority of the court to alter its formal
pronouncements in cases in which the initial instrument of adjudication is demon-
strated to have been the result of mistake or inadvertence." In re Bartlett's Will,
164 Misc. 524, 525, 299 N.Y.S. 316, 318 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1937) (citing Mat-
ter of Wing's Estate, 162 Misc. 551, 555, 295 N.Y.S. 336, 341 (Sur. Ct. Kings
County 1937). See, e.g., Estate of Brown v. Swartout, 49 A.D.2d 648, 370 N.Y.S.2d
262 (3d Dep't 1975); Robinson & Carpenter, Inc. v. Gangl, 31 A.D.2d 665, 295
N.Y.S.2d 765 (3d Dep't 1968); In re Tillman, 232 A.D. 575, 251 N.Y.S. 341 (1st
Dep't 1931). See also WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, ¶ 5701.09.
46. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701(a)(2)(iii). See, e.g., Burdick v. Murray, 6
A.D.2d 855, 175 N.Y.S.2d 287 (4th Dep't 1958); Kinner v. Shane, 268 A.D. 1022, 53
N.Y.S.2d 142 (4th Dep't 1944); Valone v. Lucas, 262 A.D. 939, 29 N.Y.S.2d 428 (4th
Dep't 1941); Gaetano v. Perretta, 217 A.D. 713, 215 N.Y.S. 683 (4th Dep't 1926);
Bothman v. Thompson Bros., Inc., 193 A.D. 694, 184 N.Y.S. 505 (1st Dep't 1920).
See WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, ¶ 5701.10, for a thorough discussion of the proce-
dure and type of orders appealable under this provision.
47. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701(a)(2)(vi). See, e.g., Simmon v. Capra, 273
A.D. 83, 75 N.Y.S.2d 574 (4th Dep't 1947) (an order dismissing the complaint for
legal insufficiency determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an
appeal can be taken); Kirsch v. Herrculean Prod. Co., 205 A.D. 530, 199 N.Y.S. 417
(1st Dep't 1923) (granting an order to strike the defendant's answer for failure to
appear at an examination before trial determines the action and prevents a judg-
ment from which an appeal can be taken). See WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, ¶
5701.20, for a discussion of the history of this provision.
48. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701(a)(2)(vii). See, e.g., Town of Islip v. Cuomo,
147 A.D.2d 56, 541 N.Y.S.2d 829 (2d Dep't 1989) (affirming and modifying an order
which declared certain provisions of the Environmental Conservation Laws to be
unconstitutional); Diamond v. Cuomo, 130 A.D.2d 292, 519 N.Y.S.2d 691 (2d Dep't
1987) (reversing the trial court's order declaring the state retirement provisions
unconstitutional); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 315, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 130
(2d Dep't 1976) (reversing the trial court's order which declared unconstitutional a
state statute providing for admissibility of a medical malpractice panel's recom-
mendation). See also WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, ¶ 5701.21 (stating similar to pro-
vision six, provision seven is seldom needed because of the two catch-all
provisions- "involves some part of the merits" and "affects a substantial right.").
9
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volving some part of the merits) and provision five (affecting a
substantial right).49
2. "Merits" and "Substantial Right"
New York's generous interlocutory appealability is due
largely to provision four, allowing appeal for orders that "[in-
volve] some part of the merits" and provision five, allowing ap-
peal for orders that "[affect] a substantial right."50 These two
provisions are "enormous magnets, overlapping the other listed
grounds."5' Most orders that are appealable by right fall within
the "substantial right" provision.5 2 However, there are certain
orders that do not come within this catch-all provision.53 Essen-
tially, these orders are "preliminary to a disposition of the mo-
tion on the merits."54 The legislature and the appellate division
49. WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, T 5701.15.
50. Commentary, supra note 31, at 577 (stating "[b]etwixt them both they
come close to licking the platter clean."). See also WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, 1
5701.15 (stating appeals that fall within these provisions range from "questions of
venue, parties, consolidation and joint trial, severance, split trials, affirmative de-
fenses, failure to prosecute, appointment and disqualification of counsel, vacating
of stipulations, and disclosure.").
51. SIEGAL, supra note 2, at 816.
52. WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, 1 5701.15. See, e.g., Turrisi v. Ponderosa, Inc.,
179 A.D.2d 956, 578 N.Y.S.2d 724 (3d Dep't 1992) (holding a substantial and im-
portant right had been affected and it was in the interest of justice to permit an
appeal when the lower court's finding might prejudice the party in a future pro-
ceeding); General Elec. Co. v. Rabin, 177 A.D.2d 354, 576 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1st Dep't
1991) (holding an order of reference to a referee to hear and report on the issue of
jurisdiction was appealable because it affects a substantial right in that it would
force one party or the other to submit to a lengthy expensive hearing); Danzig v.
Bank, 96 A.D.2d 803, 466 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1st Dep't 1983) (permitting withdrawal of
a party's motion to strike opposing party's affirmative defense is an appealable
order because it effects the parties substantial rights as effectively as a denial of a
motion); Sherman v. Morales, 50 A.D.2d 610, 375 N.Y.S.2d 377 (2d Dep't 1975)
(holding a party's right is substantially affected by an order denying that party's
motion to implead itself as a party defendant).
53. Bd. of Managers of Oaks at La Tourette v. Management Consultants Int.,
Inc., 170 A.D.2d 636, 567 N.Y.S.2d 62 (2d Dep't 1991) (referring the matter to a
judicial hearing officer to hear and report for the purposes of accounting to deter-
mine the amount owed does not affect a substantial right); Morrissey v. Morrissey,
153 A.D.2d 609, 544 N.Y.S.2d 643 (2d Dep't 1989) (directing a hearing on plaintiffs
request for counsel fees and expenses does not determine the issue and does not
effect a substantial right and therefore is not appealable by right); Devine v. De-
vine, 106 A.D.2d 487, 483 N.Y.S.2d 25 (2d Dep't 1984) (holding an order to direct a
judicial hearing to aid in the disposition of a motion does not affect a substantial
right).
54. WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, ¶ 5701.16.
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adopted the rationale that the potential harm to litigants from
these preliminary orders is not great, and therefore there is no
need for appellate supervision.55
The "Merits" has been defined as "the strict legal rights of
the parties, as contradistinguished from those mere questions
of practice which every court regulates for itself, and from all
matters which depend upon the discretion or favor of the court
.... "6 Many of the orders that "involve some part of the mer-
its" overlap the "substantial right" provision.57 Hence, these
two provisions are often interchangeable.5 8
3. Permission59
Although the Committee was unsuccessful in eliminating
the two provisions that allow broad appealability by right, it
was successful in introducing the concept of permission. The
legislature has enumerated three orders that require permis-
sion for appealability: 1) orders in an Article 78 proceeding;60 2)
orders requiring or refusing to require a more definite state-
ment in a pleading;6 ' and 3) orders requiring or refusing to or-
55. See id.
56. St. John v. West, 4 How. Pr. 329, 322 (N.Y. 1850).
57. Nemeroff Realty Corp. v. Kerr, 38 A.D.2d 437, 330 N.Y.S.2d 632 (2d Dep't
1972) (holding that the order involved some part of the merits and affected a sub-
stantial right).
58. WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, 1 5701.15.
59. Unlike orders appealable by right, notice is not required for orders that
are appealable by permission, because "both parties will have an opportunity to
present their contentions on the motion for leave to appeal." See WEINSTEIN, supra
note 27, ¶ 5701.06.
60. N.Y. Civ. PlAc. L. & R. 7801 (McKinney 1978). Article 78 covers the mat-
ters that at common law fell under the prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 7801 commentary at 25. Today, a party
proceeds under Article 78 to challenge action (or inaction) by agencies and officers
of state and local government. Id. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Dep't of Fire of City of
Syracuse, 112 A.D.2d 751, 492 N.Y.S.2d 249 (4th Dep't 1985) (holding an appeal
from a nonfinal intermediate order pursuant to CPLR Article 78 does not lie as of
right); Schwartzberg v. Whalen, 87 A.D.2d 665, 666, 448 N.Y.S.2d 838, 840 (3d
Dep't 1982) (stating an order pursuant to an Article 78 proceeding entered prior to
judgment requires permission to appeal); Neumark v. N.Y. City Police Property
Clerk, 122 A.D.2d 210, 211, 504 N.Y.S.2d 744 (2d Dep't 1980) (holding permission
is required from an order entered prior to judgment in an Article 78 proceeding).
61. Alexander v. Kiviranna, 52 A.D.2d 982, 383 N.Y.S.2d 122, 123 (3d Dep't
1976) (holding an order requiring the plaintiff to make a more definite statement
in the complaint requires permission to appeal); Williams v. Fitting, 29 A.D.2d
772, 287 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (2d Dep't 1968) (holding an order denying a motion to
11
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der that scandalous or prejudicial matter be stricken from the
pleading.62 The legislature preferred an approach that enumer-
ated certain orders that require permission, rather than listing
all the orders that are appealable by right.63 The legislature
should amend the statute and add orders to the list if they de-
termine that appeals from these orders are delaying the trial
process. 64 Despite the authority to amend the statute, the legis-
lature has not added any new orders to the list.65
In all instances where an appeal may not be taken as of
right, a party may seek permission for an immediate appeal. 66
A party has the option of either 1) seeking permission from the
trial judge who made the order and, if he or she refuses, from a
justice of the appellate division, or 2) seeking leave directly
from a justice of the appellate division.67 The appellate division
has not set forth a standard to determine when a justice should
grant permission.68 Inevitably, each justice has broad discre-
tion to decide whether to allow an immediate appeal.69
serve an amended complaint repleading the first cause of action requires permis-
sion to appeal).
62. Alberi v. Rossi, 108 A.D.2d 833, 485 N.Y.S.2d 337 (2d Dep't 1985) (holding
an order to strike scandalous or prejudicial matter from a pleading is not appeala-
ble as of right); Ocean-Clear, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 91 A.D.2d 680, 459
N.Y.S.2d 431 (2d Dep't 1982) (holding an order striking prejudicial matter from the
complaint is not appealable by right).
63. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 143.
64. Id. at 144.
65. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701(b).
66. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5701(c).
67. Id.
68. WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, | 5701.27. But cf Swartz v. Wallace, 87 A.D.2d
926, 927, 450 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (3d Dep't 1982) (granting permission to appeal an
interlocutory order in an Article 78 proceeding because of the 1) "significant in-
volvement of the order in the merits of the proceeding" and 2) "the importance of
the issues presented"). See infra text accompanying notes 139-47, for an explana-
tion and illustrations of the different types of standards.
69. Compare Arnofsky v. Marine Park Chiropractic Ctr., 81 A.D.2d 570, 437
N.Y.S.2d 422 (2d Dep't 1981) (denying an application for leave to appeal an order
directing the defendants to appear for further examination before trial); Goodman
v. Nickerson, 24 A.D.2d 726, 263 N.Y.S.2d 312 (2d Dep't 1965) (denying leave to
appeal an order to dismiss an Article 78 proceeding) with New York City Health
and Hosp. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 43 A.D.2d 513, 348 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1st Dep't 1973)
(granting permission to appeal an order denying intervention), cert. denied, 309
N.E.2d 128 (1974); Nemeroff Realty Corp. v. Kerr, 38 A.D.2d 437, 439, 330
N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (2d Dep't 1972) (granting permission to appeal a determination
of a town planning director, because of the importance of the determination).
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Because almost any interlocutory order is appealable by
right, a party rarely needs to seek permission.70 Although ap-
peals by permission are infrequently exercised, commentators
maintain that this new concept provides a good framework for
developing "a rational system of intermediate appeals" in the
future.7 '
New York's decision to allow broad appealability at the
trial stage provides much supervision over the trial process. 72
With this added supervision, however, come many negative con-
sequences. First, the appellate division's caseload increases.73
Second, the appellate division justices have less time to spend
on other matters. 74 Third, the trial court must deal with the
possibility of constant interruptions.7 5 Finally, a party may
abuse this generous appealability by using it as a tactic to delay
the trial process.76
III. Alternative Approaches
A. The Federal System
In contrast to New York, a party may rarely appeal an in-
terlocutory order in federal court.77 The reason is that the cir-
cuit courts are governed by the final judgment rule which
precludes any interlocutory order from being appealed
immediately.78
70. Commentary, supra note 31, at 577. See also SIEGAL, supra note 2, at 818
(stating permission is rarely invoked because a party would be asking essentially
that "a judge allow the appeal because of the established unimportance of the
issue.").
71. WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, 1 5701.03.
72. Botler, supra note 3, at 954.
73. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 1.
74. MACCRATE, supra note 6, at 87.
75. Botler, supra note 3, at 954.
76. MACCRATE, supra note 6, at 87.
77. SIEGAL, supra note 2, § 642 (stating "[i]t is in respect of the appeal from a
nonfinal disposition (an interlocutory or intermediate order) that the two practices
are diametrically opposed: in New York, virtually any such order can be appealed
immediately and need not await the final judgment; in federal practice almost
none can be, with a few exceptions.").
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1993) (stating the courts of appeals shall have jurisdic-
tion of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States).
A final judgment is an order that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324
6191996]
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The federal courts adhere strictly to the finality require-
ments.79 A major policy reason behind finality is to prohibit
piecemeal disposal of litigation.80 A single appeal that ad-
dresses all trial court objections is more efficient than several
appeals that require separate briefs, records, oral arguments
and opinions.81 Other reasons for adhering to the final judg-
ment rule are: 1) the appellate court has a broader perspective
when reviewing the various rulings being challenged; 82 2) the
trial process proceeds more swiftly; 8 3 3) increased respect for
the authority of the trial judge; 84 4) to prevent parties from de-
laying the trial by appealing every adverse ruling;85 and 5) to
achieve certainty and predictability.86
Although the federal system applies a strict final judgment
rule, judicial and statutory exceptions exist.87 These excep-
tions, however, are very limited. Two well-established judicial
exceptions are: 1) the Collateral Order Doctrine;88 and 2) the
Forgay Doctrine. 9 To invoke the Collateral Order Doctrine, the
lower court's decision must: a) determine a matter collateral to
the rights underlying the action, and b) be too important to
deny review.90 The collateral order exception is very limited.91
To invoke the Forgay Doctrine, a party must claim that
there is some immediate harm that might occur if review is
U.S. 229, 233 (1945). See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 2, § 13.1, for the definition of
the final judgment rule.
79. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 2, § 13.1.
80. 9 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 110.07 (2d ed.
1985) [hereinafter MOORE].
81. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 2, § 13.1. See Baltimore Contractors v. Bod-
inger, 348 U.S. 176, 178 (1955) (expressing Congress' desire to avoid piecemeal
appeals).
82. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 2, § 13.1.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. MOORE, supra note 80, ¶ 110.07 (stating it is essential that lawyers know
what may and may not be appealed).
87. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 2, §§ 13.2-3.
88. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
89. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848).
90. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
91. Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1203, 1208 (1995) (stating
only a small percentage of orders fall within the collateral order doctrine); Desktop
Direct, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 993 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating the col-
lateral order doctrine should not be used without compelling justification).
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postponed. 9 2 This occurs, for example, when the trial court's de-
termination is such that it necessarily requires some immediate
act or conduct that will be irremediable should later review re-
veal that it was improperly ordered.9 3
By statute, Congress permits interlocutory orders to be ap-
pealed by right or by permission. 9 4 Similar to the judicial excep-
tions, these are also limited.95 Congress has expressly specified
which interlocutory orders are appealable by right.9 6 The list
includes: 1) orders involving injunctions; 2) orders with respect
to receivership proceedings; and 3) orders determining rights
and liabilities in admiralty proceedings.9 7 Congress has con-
cluded that these orders need constant appellate supervision to
protect the parties' rights.9 8
A party may appeal an interlocutory order, not appealable
by right, by seeking permission from the district court judge
who presides over the case.99 Then, assuming the district judge
certifies the order for appeal, the party must seek permission
from the appellate court in his or her jurisdiction. 00 The order
must involve a controlling question of law with substantial
grounds for difference of opinion, and the immediate appeal
from the order must materially advance the ultimate termina-
92. Forgay, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 201.
93. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 2, § 13.2.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1993).
95. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981) (stating that:
[Section] 1292(a)(1) was intended to carve out only a limited exception to the
final judgment rule. [Wie have construed the statute narrowly to ensure
that appeal as of right under § 1292(a)(1) will be available only in circum-
stances where an appeal will further the statutory purpose of 'permit[ting]
litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps ir-
reparable, consequence.').
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)1-3.
98. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 2, § 13.3. See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S.
61, 86-87 n.58 (1974) (stating "[i]t is for the same reason, the possibility of drastic
consequences which cannot later be corrected, that an exception is made to the
final judgment rule to permit review of preliminary injunctions.") (quoting Pan
Am. World Airways Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs' Int'l Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840, 843 (1962));
Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525 (1897) (permitting the defendant to
obtain immediate relief from an injunction, the continuance of which throughout
the case may seriously affect his interests).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
100. Id.
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tion of the litigation.101 The appealing party bears the heavy
burden of convincing each court to grant permission.1 02
Ultimately, each court has discretion whether to permit an
interlocutory appeal.1 03 This freedom allows the trial court to
reflect on whether the appellant truly raises an important issue
or whether he or she is merely using a delay tactic. 104 The ap-
pellate court can then assess its workload and decide whether
the order requires immediate review. 05
In 1958, Congress departed significantly from the final
judgment rule when it allowed interlocutory orders to be ap-
pealed by permission.1 06 By enacting the Interlocutory Appeals
Act, 07 Congress created a situation which allows a party to ap-
peal every interlocutory order if certain requirements are
met. 108 Congress' intent was to increase judicial economy by al-
lowing the circuit courts to decide issues at the pre-trial stage
that could ultimately end the case.109
Congress continues to depart from the final judgment rule.
In 1992, Congress enacted the Federal Courts Administration
Act ("FCAA").110 Section 101 of the FCAA permits the Supreme
Court to provide for additional interlocutory appeals to the
courts of appeals."' The amendment is designed to expand the
number of interlocutory orders that are appealable to the courts
101. Id.
102. See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976) (illustrates
the difficulty in meeting the three requirements of section 1292(b)). See also Case
Comment, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
88 HARv. L. REV. 607, 607 n.5 (1975) (maintaining that slightly over 1000 applica-
tions for leave to appeal under § 1292(b) had been filed and only fifty-three percent
had been accepted).
103. S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255, 5257.
104. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474-75 (1978).
105. Id. at 475.
106. MOORE, supra note 80, 1 110.22[1].
107. Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1996)).
108. MOORE, supra note 80, 1 110.22[1].
109. The purpose of section 1292(b) was to "aid in the disposition of cases
before the district courts of the United States by saving useless expenditures of
court time . . . ." S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255, 5257.
110. Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(e)(1996)).
111. Id.
622 [Vol. 16:607
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss3/6
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
of appeals.11 2 This indicates Congress' intent to depart from the
final judgment rule and increase the number of interlocutory
orders that may be appealed immediately.113
B. The Single Justice Approach
Massachusetts has a unique way of dealing with civil inter-
locutory appeals. It allows prompt review from any interlocu-
tory order of the Massachusetts Superior Court, the Probate
Court, the Housing Court and the Land Court.114 However, a
party is entitled to review only by a single justice, unless the
order involves a preliminary injunction."15
A "single justice" is a judge in one of the appellate courts,
acting alone." 6 Periodically, each associate justice in the
Supreme Judicial Court11 7 and each justice in the Appeals
Court" 8 takes his or her turn for about a month and sits as the
single justice."1 9 The single justice session is a separate session
conducted in the Supreme Judicial Court and the Appeals
Court.12 0 Essentially, single justice review is review by one
judge, as opposed to full appellate review, which is made up of a
panel of three or more judges.121
112. H.R. REP. No. 1006, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1992), reprinted in
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3921, 3927.
113. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
114. MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 118 (West 1994). The superior court,
probate court, housing court and land court are various trial courts in
Massachusetts.
115. Id. With regard to preliminary injunctions, a party has the option of sin-
gle justice review or plenary appellate review. Id. See John H. Henn, Civil Inter-
locutory Appeals to the Single Justice Under Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter
231, § 118 First Paragraph, 33 BOSTON B.J., Jan-Feb. 1989, at 12-13 for a discus-
sion of preliminary injunctive review in Massachusetts [hereinafter Henn, Single
Justice].
116. Henn, Single Justice, supra note 115, at 10 (providing a thorough expla-
nation of how the "single justice" approach operates in Massachusetts).
117. The Supreme Judicial Court is the highest state court in Massachusetts.
118. The Appeals Court is the intermediate court in Massachusetts. See
Daniel J. Johnedis, Massachusetts' Two-Court Appellate System in Operation, 60
MAsS. L.Q. 77 (1975), for an excellent discussion on the appellate court system in
Massachusetts.
119. Henn, Single Justice, supra note 115, at 10.
120. Id.
121. Id. See also John H. Henn, Civil Interlocutory Appeals in Massachusetts
State Courts, 62 MAsS. L.Q. 225, 226 (1977) [hereinafter Henn, Interlocutory Ap-
peals]. The Supreme Judicial Court is one court with two dockets: "a full court
docket and a single justice docket"; the court has provided by rule for these two
1996] 623
17
624 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:607
A party may petition a single justice for relief from any in-
terlocutory order. 122 Once the petition is filed, the judge must
consider it.123 Hence, any interlocutory order can be taken
before the single justice as a matter of right.124
The petition requirements are informal and the process is
rather expeditious; the only strict requirement is that an ag-
grieved party must file his or her petition within thirty days of
the issuance of the order.1 25 The petition should contain: 1) in-
troductory paragraphs (identifying the lower court's order, stat-
ing the relief sought, demonstrating proper jurisdiction,
whether a prompt decision is needed, and whether oral argu-
ment is requested); 2) the names of the parties; 3) the relevant
facts; 4) the error below; and 5) the relief requested. 126 There is
no specific form for a written response by the opposing party.127
One commentator advises that the opposing party should incor-
porate only his or her opposing arguments into the petition.1 28
In certain situations, the parties may be entitled to a hear-
ing.1 29 One commentator suggests that the party requesting a
dockets for many years by reason of the fact that "the Supreme Judicial Court" for
some purposes sits as a full court and for other purposes sits by a single justice. Id.
(quoting Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07(2)).
122. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 118. The statute provides in pertinent
part:
1) [a] party aggrieved by an interlocutory order of a trial court justice ...
may file within thirty days of entry of such order, a petition in the appropri-
ate appellate court seeking relief from such order. A single justice of the
appellate court may, in his discretion, grant the same relief as an appellate
court . . . 2) [a] party aggrieved by an interlocutory order of a trial court
justice ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving a prelimi-
nary injunction, or refusing to dissolve a preliminary injunction, or a party
aggrieved by an interlocutory order of a single justice of the appellate court
granting a petition for relief from such an order, may appeal . . . to the ap-
peals court or . . . Supreme Judicial Court.
Id. See Henn, Single Justice, supra note 115, at 10.
123. Henn, Single Justice, supra note 115, at 10.
124. Id. (stating that because the single justice has a duty to consider every
petition for interlocutory review, it follows therefore that "all interlocutory orders
can be 'appealed'.").
125. Id. at 11.
126. Id.
127. Henn, Single Justice, supra note 115, at 10.
128. Id. (Henn states that the general rule is "the fewer papers filed the bet-
ter. . . .").
129. Id. at 11-12. The single justice in the Appeals Court may grant a hearing
as a matter of discretion. See Tisei v. Building Inspector of Marlborough, 3 Mass.
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss3/6
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hearing should arrange an available time with his or her oppo-
nent and then convince the single justice's clerk that a hearing
is essential to the disposition of the matter.1 30
Once the petition is before the single justice, he or she has
the same power as an appellate court to grant relief. 13 In addi-
tion, the single justice enjoys broad discretion to deny the peti-
tion if he or she so chooses.132 This discretion allows the single
justice to eliminate frivolous petitions, grant relief and refer or-
ders to a full bench. 133 One commentator states that the Massa-
chusetts' approach is a good compromise between New York's
policy that allows almost any interlocutory order to be appealed
by right and reviewed before a full bench, and the federal policy
that is quite strict with allowing interlocutory appeals.xa4
C. Permission- A Flexible Approach to Interlocutory Appeals
In 1951, Judge Jerome Frank of the Judicial Conference of
the United States proposed that the Federal courts of appeals
be given the authority to hear interlocutory appeals by permis-
App. Ct. 377, 378 (1975). On the other hand, the single justice in the Supreme
Judicial Court sits once a week. See Henn, Single Justice, supra note 115, at 12
n.25.
130. See Henn, Single Justice, supra note 115, at 12.
131. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 118 (providing in pertinent part that
"[a] single justice of the appellate court may, in his discretion, grant the same re-
lief as an appellate court is authorized to grant pending an appeal. . . .").
132. Packaging Indus. Group v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 110 (Mass. 1980)
(holding the single justice enjoys broad discretion to deny the petition, to modify,
annul or suspend the execution of the interlocutory order, or finally, to report the
request for relief to the appropriate appellate court). See Henn, Single Justice,
supra note 115, at 10 (stating "any interlocutory order can be brought before a
single justice who will then consider it and is empowered to do something about it;
whether he or she will do so is an entirely different matter.").
133. Henn, Single Justice, supra note 115, at 12.
134. Henn, Interlocutory Appeals, supra note 121, at 233-34 (Henn states that
unlike the federal system, but similar to New York, a party may take any interloc-
utory order to the intermediate appellate court. However, unlike New York but
similar to the federal system, a party is only entitled to review before a single
justice). The single justice approach which is a
'second bite at the apple' before another judge, reflects a wise compromise
between those who would like plenary appellate review for any interlocutory
order- an impossible task for the present appellate courts and a potential
source of dramatic growth in litigation costs- and those who would wish no
appeals from interlocutory orders (other than preliminary injunctions).
Henn, Single Justice, supra note 115, at 14.
19
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sion.135 In 1958, Congress enacted the Interlocutory Appeals
Act ("Act").1 36 The Act substantially eroded the final judgment
rule by allowing a party to appeal potentially every interlocu-
tory order immediately.1 37
Many states followed this new concept, which allows courts
to grant permission to review immediately certain interlocutory
orders.138 Unlike the federal system, however, most states do
not have such a strict criteria that must be met before an inter-
locutory order may be appealed upon permission.1 39 Some
states give courts great flexibility to decide which interlocutory
orders may be appealed;1 40 the legislature achieves this flexibil-
ity by broadly defining the statute that determines when per-
mission may be granted.141
The American Bar Association ("ABA") has taken the ap-
proach that the standard for granting permission must be broad
135. MOORE, supra note 80, 1 110.22[1].
136. Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1996)). Section 1292(b) states in pertinent part: an order is appealable
if it involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation. Id.
137. Id. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
138. Code Me. R. § 72(c) (1992); GA. R. S. CT. R. 22; N.J. R. A. R. 2:2-4; N.Y.
Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 5701(b),(c) (McKinney 1978); TENN. R. OF APP. PRo. 9; WASH. CT.
R. 2.3(b)(1)-(3); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 809.50 (West 1994).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
140. See DEL. ST. S. CT. R. 42(d)(v) (stating the court may consider all rele-
vant factors, including the decision of the trial court whether to certify the interloc-
utory appeal); GA. R. S. CT. R. 22 (stating permission to appeal an interlocutory
order will be granted only when: "1) [tlhe issue to be decided appears to be disposi-
tive of the case, or 2) [tlhe order appears erroneous and will probably cause a sub-
stantial error at trial, or 3) [tlhe establishment of a precedent is desirable."); Code
Me. R. § 72(c) (stating "[if the court is of the opinion that a question of law in-
volved in an interlocutory order or ruling made by it in any action in the Superior
Court ought to be determined by the Law Court before any further proceedings are
taken therein, it may on motion of the aggrieved party report the case to the Law
Court for that purpose . . . ."); N.J. R. A. R. 2:2-4 (stating "the Appellate Division
may grant leave to appeal, in the interest of justice, from any interlocutory order
. . . ."); WASH. CT. R. 2.3 (b)(1)-(3) (stating review will be granted if the lower court
"has committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings useless;
or . . . has committed probable error and the decision . .. substantially alters the
status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act; or . . . has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceeding, or so far sanc-
tioned such a departure . . . as to call for review by the appellate court.").
141. ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATEs 86 (2d ed.
1988) [hereinafter STERN).
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enough to allow sufficient flexibility, but specific enough for
judges and lawyers to know what is and is not potentially ap-
pealable.1 42 Under the ABA approach, an appellate court may
grant permission on a showing:
that review of the judgment or order immediately rather than on
an appeal from the final judgment in that case or proceeding will
materially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify fur-
ther proceedings therein, protect a party from substantial and ir-
reparable injury, or clarify an issue of general importance in the
administration of justice.143
Some states have adopted the ABA approach.1 44 The ap-
proach is broad enough to allow the court enough flexibility to
grant permission.1 4 5 However, it is narrow and requires the
court to consider specific factors in its determination.1 4 6 The
factors reduce uncertainty by informing lawyers and judges
what is potentially appealable. 147
142. Id. at 87 (citing STANDARDS RELATING To APPELLATE COURTS § 3.12
(1977)).
143. Id.
144. TENN. R. OF APP. PRO. 9(a):
[Dietermining whether to grant permission to appeal, the following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the courts' discretion, indicate the
character of the reasons that will be considered: 1) the need to prevent irrep-
arable injury, giving consideration to the severity of the potential injury, the
probability of its occurrence, and the probability that review upon entry of
the final judgment will be ineffective; 2) the need to prevent needless, expen-
sive, and protracted litigation, giving consideration to whether the chal-
lenged order would be a basis for reversal upon entry of a final judgment,
the probability of reversal, and whether an interlocutory appeal will result
in a net reduction in the duration and expense of the litigation if the chal-
lenged order is reversed; and 3) the need to develop a uniform body of law,
giving consideration to the existence of inconsistent orders of other courts
and whether the question presented by the challenged order will not other-
wise be reviewable upon entry of final judgment.
Id. See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 809.50(1)(c) (West 1994) (stating an interlocutory
order will be granted, if a party can show an immediate appeal of an order "will
materially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify further proceedings
therein, protect a party from substantial or irreparable injury, or clarify an issue of
general importance in the administration of justice"). See also ALASKA R. OF APP.
PRO. 402(b)(1)-(4).
145. See STERN, supra note 141, at 87.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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The federal system conditions interlocutory review on a dis-
trict judge's certificate stating the standard has been met.1 48
Some states have followed this approach.1 49 Other states re-
quire a party to seek permission directly from the appellate
court. 50 The ABA has recommended that the lower court give
its opinion on whether review is appropriate, but that this opin-
ion should not bind the appellate court.11
Requiring certification by the trial judge reduces the bur-
den on the appellate court from having to review each peti-
tion.152 On the other hand, because certification lies largely in
the discretion of the trial judge, he or she may prevent the ap-
pellate court from hearing certain meritorious appeals. 53
The benefit of direct application to the appellate court is
that it creates a simpler process because only one application is
required in one court.154 If the appellate court is already over-
whelmed with cases, however, and there is a genuine fear that
attorneys will file frivolous petitions, then the direct application
method may unduly burden the appellate court.155
IV. The Caseload Crisis in the Appellate Division
On September 20, 1989, Former Governor Mario M. Cuomo
and Former Chief Judge Sol Wachtler of the New York Court of
Appeals established the Appellate Division Task Force ("Task
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text for
an explanation and illustrations of the different types of standards.
149. DEL. ST. S. CT. R. 42(b); GA. R. S. CT. R. 22; Code Me. R. § 72(c) (1994);
TENN. R. OF APP. PRO. 9(b).
150. ALAsKA R. OF APP. Pao. 402(a)(1); IowA R. 2(a); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 809.50(1) (West 1994).
151. The ABA recommendation states in pertinent part:
[t]he most desirable combination is to provide that, in every case where in-
terlocutory review is sought, the lower court should give its opinion whether
such review is appropriate, but that its determination should not bind the
appellate court. Such an arrangement would give the appellate court the
benefit of the lower court's view of the matter, but reserve the ultimate deci-
sion to the appellate court.
STERN, supra note 141, at 91 (citing STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURT
§ 3.12 (1977)).
152. STERN, supra note 141, at 89.
153. Id. at 90. See also MOORE, supra note 80, ¶ 110.22[3].
154. STERN, supra note 141, at 89.
155. Id.
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Force").15 6 At the end of its research, the Task Force concluded
that there is a significant caseload crisis in the Second Depart-
ment of the Appellate Division ("Second Department").15 7 The
Task Force decided that to address this crisis, temporary and
long-term measures are needed. 58
Due to the strain on the Second Department, the Task
Force concluded that justices are required to decide too many
cases and litigants must wait unconscionably long for a deci-
sion.15 9 Essentially, this pressure is jeopardizing the consistent
high quality of appellate justice in the Second Department.1 60
The population growth in the Second Department, com-
pared to the other three departments, is a major reason for its
tremendous workload.161 Another major reason is the drastic
increase in the number of appeals filed in the Second Depart-
ment.1 62 In 1989, forty-two percent of the appeals filed in the
state were filed in the Second Department. 63 Another factor for
the tremendous workload is increased delay in the Second De-
partment caused by a backlog of uncalendared appeals.164 In
1989, it took twice as long for a civil appeal to be disposed of in
the Second Department than in the other three departments. 65
Based on this statistic, the Task Force concluded that parties
must wait unreasonably long to have their appeals decided.166
156. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 1. The research of the Task Force was "over
one year of careful and thorough study, intense discussions, analysis of case load
statistics and receipt of reports from numerous justices and clerks of the Appellate
Divisions, as well as from bar associations throughout the State . Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 37.
159. Id. at 16.
160. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 16.
161. Id. at 6-8. The Second Department covers half the population. Id. at 6.
162. Id. at 8-13.
163. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 11.
164. Id. at 13.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 14. See tables indicating that from the time appellants filed their
brief, it took the court about 4.5 months to render a decision in the First Depart-
ment, 11.97 months in the Second Department, 6.3 months in the Third Depart-
ment, and 5.3 months in the Fourth Department. Id. In 1993, the Second
Department had "a twenty-one month delay in calendaring civil appeals from the
date of the appellant's perfection of the appeal . . . ." Spiros A. Tsimbinos, Some
Possible Solutions to the Crisis in the Appellate Division, Second Department, 209
N.Y. L.J. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Tsimbinos].
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The Task Force considered a number of alternatives to help
alleviate the current caseload crisis. 167 The list included: 1) ad-
ding more justices to the Second Department; 2) transferring
some of the Second Department appeals to other departments;
3) creating a Fifth Department; 4) transferring judicial districts
from one department to another; 5) limiting the number of in-
terlocutory appeals; and 6) reducing the panel of justices to
three.16 8
The Task Force concluded unanimously that additional jus-
tices should be added to the Second Department. 6 9 They also
advocated continuing the Interdepartmental Case Transfer
Plan.170 In addition, the Task Force unanimously recommended
that the Second Department should return to sitting in panels
of five justices.171 Further, they advocated that the personnel
from the four departments should meet on a regular basis.1 72
Finally, the Task Force concluded that a long-term structural
solution to the work-load problem must be implemented.173
Other proposals that gained endorsement were: 1) creation of a
Fifth Department; 74 and 2) moving the Ninth Judicial District
from the Second to the Third Department.' 75
However, the Task Force was unanimously opposed to any
proposal that would limit the right to appeal interlocutory or-
ders to the appellate division. 76 The report stated that the re-
view of interlocutory orders "is an important provision by which
167. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 17.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. The plan requires certain appeals to be transferred from the Sec-
ond Department to the other departments. Id.
171. Id.
172. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 17.
173. Id.
174. See id. Seven members believed a Fifth Department should be created to
distribute the appellate work more equally among the departments in the appel-
late division. Id.
175. See id. Moving the Ninth Judicial District would distribute the workload
among the departments more equally. Id.
176. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 35-36. The Task Force relied on a two year
study of interlocutory appeals by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
which indicated that about thirty-five percent of the interlocutory appeals resulted
in a reversal or a modification. Id. at 36. This statistic was "enough to persuade
that Association, and the members of this Task Force, to conclude that the Appel-
late Divisions play an important error correcting role in their review of interlocu-
tory orders." Id.
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the appellate division exercises both its supervisory and error
correcting roles as an intermediate appellate court."17 7 The
Task Force concluded that interlocutory appellate review
should not be sacrificed for the sake of expediency.178
In recent times, commentators have advocated the need to
confront the workload problem in the appellate division. 79 One
of the most popular recommendations is the creation of a Fifth
Department.o80 However, this proposal poses certain obsta-
cles.' 8 ' First, a constitutional amendment is required.1 82 Sec-
ond, it would take approximately three years before a Fifth
Department could be implemented 83 Finally, a new depart-
ment would cost between twenty and twenty-five million
dollars. 184
On the other hand, commentators have argued that a limi-
tation on the ability to appeal interlocutory orders would save
the appellate division valuable judicial resources. 85 In addi-
tion, this proposal does not pose any of the problems the Fifth
Department experienced.1 86 First, the New York State Consti-
tution already permits the legislature to restrict interlocutory
appeals, and therefore only a legislative amendment is re-
quired.1 87 Second, because only a legislative amendment is
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Gary Spencer, Mangano Backs a New Fifth Department Appellate Divi-
sion Called Only Solution to Increasing Backlog, 209 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1993); See also
Gary Spencer, Relief for Third Dep't Proposed First, Second Dept's would Split
Ninth District's Appellate Load, 209 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1993); Tsimbinos, supra note 166,
at 1; Daniel Schulman, Too Few Judges or Too Many Appeals, 210 N.Y. L.J. 2
(1993) [hereinafter Schulman].
180. See Tsimbinos, supra note 166, at 1; Schulman, supra note 179, at 2.
181. See Tsimbinos, supra note 166, at 1.
182. Id. Amendments can be enacted either through 1) approval by a majority
of the State Senate and Assembly in two consecutive legislative sessions, and the
people approve the amendment by majority vote or 2) approval by a majority vote
of the delegates to a constitutional convention, and the people approve the amend-
ment by a majority vote. N.Y. CONST. art. 19, §§ 1, 2. In addition, the voters in
New York have already turned down a proposal to create a Fifth Department in
1967 and in 1971. Tsimbinos, supra note 166, at 1.
183. Tsimbinos, supra note 166, at 1.
184. Schulman, supra note 179, at 2.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 4(k). Section 4(k) states in pertinent part "that the
right to appeal to the appellate divisions from a judgment or order which does not
25
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needed, New York can restrict interlocutory appeals in less time
than it can create a Fifth Department. 88 Finally, restricting in-
terlocutory appeals costs New York nothing financially; how-
ever, it preserves judicial economy at the appellate division
level.189
V. The Controversy Over Unlimited Interlocutory
Appealability
Despite the Task Force's conclusion, continuing debate ex-
ists over the efficiency of New York's interlocutory appellate re-
view system.o90 In 1979, in a study of the appellate division's
history and role as an intermediate appellate court, two propos-
als were offered to streamline the system.' 9 ' Under the first
proposal, a party could appeal an interlocutory order upon per-
mission only, banning appealability as of right.1 92 Under the
second proposal, a party could appeal certain types of interlocu-
tory orders by right but then he or she must obtain permission
to appeal all other orders. 93 The standard for permission would
be "whether the appeal will advance the litigation or delay it."194
Each proposal would require a party to petition the trial judge
for leave to appeal. 95
finally determine an action or special proceeding may be limited or conditioned by
law." Id.
188. Schulman, supra note 179, at 2.
189. See id.
190. WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, 1 5701.03. See also MACCRATE, supra note 6,
at 86-87. Many argue that
the extreme use of appealability of intermediate orders has had a serious
impact on the courts. At the appellate level, it contributes to burdensome
caseloads, specifically in the First and Second Departments. For the trial
courts, intermediate appeals create drawn-out, piecemeal litigation and
present opportunities for abuse by litigants who use appeals as devices to
delay and harass their adversaries. . . . [On the other hand,] it is argued
that the review of intermediate orders is an important means by which the
Appellate Division exercises both its supervisory and its error-correcting
roles as an intermediate court.
MACCRATE, supra note 6, at 86-87. See also Botler, supra note 3, at 992 (stating
that there is a "belief that intermediate orders are often perfunctory and are fre-
quently used as a delaying tactic.").
191. Botler, supra note 3.
192. Botler, supra note 3, at 1006-07.
193. Id. at 1007.
194. Id. at 1008.
195. Id. at 1007.
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The researchers considered the second proposal more effi-
cient than the first.196 The reasons offered were: 1) it would re-
quire only a simple redrafting of the statute;'97 and 2) it would
be a good balance between the strict finality requirements in
the federal system and New York's generous approach.198
In 1987, a Committee on State Courts of Superior Jurisdic-
tion of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York ("Com-
mittee") recommended that the rules governing the time
allowed for perfection of interlocutory appeals be amended. 99
Specifically, the Committee advocated that "much of the prob-
lem of delay can be alleviated if the time for perfecting the ap-
peals in the First and Second Departments is shortened from
the present nine months." 200 The Committee stated that ninety
days should be sufficient time to prepare an appeal from an in-
terlocutory order.201 To this date, the four departments in the
appellate division have not changed their rules. 202
196. Botler, supra note 3, at 1007.
197. Id. at 1007-08, suggesting that
[tihe catch-all categories of orders affecting a substantial right and orders
involving a part of the merits could be transferred to section 5701(b), which
lists the orders appealable by permission. This would limit appealability as
of right to the specific situations which would remain in section 5701(a):
orders respecting provisional remedies, new trials, transcripts or state-
ments on appeal, and the constitutionality of state statutes, and orders
which would prevent judgments from which an appeal could be taken.
Id.
198. See id. at 1008.
199. COMMITTEE ON STATE COURTS OF SUPERIOR JURISDICTION OF THE ASSOCIA-
TION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON APPEALS OF INTERLOCU-
TORY ORDERS 66-68 (1987) [hereinafter REPORT]. Based on the data that the
Committee gathered, it concluded that New York should not alter CPLR 5701. Id.
at 64-66. In addition, the Committee recommended that CPLR 5701 should be
altered only based upon empirical evidence. Id. at 69.
200. Id. at 68.
201. Id.
202. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 600.11(a)(3) (1986) (stating in
the First Department "[tihe clerk will place no civil appeal or cause on the calendar
where the necessary papers and briefs are not offered for filing within nine months
of the date of the notice of appeal from the judgment or order appealed from,...
and in appeals to the Appellate Division by permission within nine months from
the date of the order granting leave to appeal, unless the time for filing has been
enlarged by order of the court."; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 800.12
(1991) (stating in the Third Department "[a] civil appeal or proceeding shall be
deemed to have been abandoned where appellant or petitioner shall fail to serve
and file a record and brief within the nine months after the date of the notice of
appeal or order of transfer . . . ."); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22,
27
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In the early 1980's, a questionnaire concerning the caseload
crisis in the appellate division was sent to the appellate division
justices. 203 The justices were asked whether the appellate divi-
sion's jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals should be cur-
tailed.204 Forty-four percent supported curtailing jurisdiction,
while fifty-six percent opposed such a measure. 205 The reasons
given in support were that interlocutory appeals often are used
to delay the trial process and reduce the amount of time spent
on more important matters.206 In opposition, many justices ar-
gued that interlocutory appeals can sometimes determine the
case, and they may provide guidance to the lower courts.207
In order to supplement the questionnaire sent to the appel-
late division justices in the early 1980's, this author sent a ques-
tionnaire on September 12, 1994.208 Ten questions were
advanced.
The first question asked how many years the justice had
served on the appellate division.209 The average time was
eleven years.210 The second question was whether the jurisdic-
tion of the appellate division to hear interlocutory appeals
should be curtailed. 211 Fifty-nine percent responded that the
appellate division's jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals
§ 1000.3(b)(2)(i) (1992) (stating in the Fourth Department "[a] civil appeal ... shall
be deemed to have been abandoned and dismissed . .. where the appellant or peti-
tioner shall fail to serve and file the records and briefs within nine months from
the date of the notice of appeal or order of transfer."). But cf N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 22, § 670.8(d), (e) (1993) (stating in the Second Department there is a
six month period to perfect an appeal from the date of the notice of appeal or order
granting leave to appeal but there is a good cause exception to enlarge the time).
203. MACCRATE, supra note 6, at 129. The Study Group mailed forty-nine
questionnaires to current and recently retired members of the appellate division.
Id. The Group received a response of sixty-nine percent (thirty-four question-
naires were returned). Id. The justices were asked specific questions on appeala-
bility, scope of review, possibility of a three judge panel and current workload. Id.
at 129-39.
204. Id. at 132.
205. MACCRATE, supra, note 6, at 132.
206. Id. at 132-33.
207. Id.
208. See infra Appendix A- Questionnaire to the appellate division justices.
The author of this article sent a questionnaire to each justice in the First, Second,
Third and Fourth Departments of the appellate division. This encompassed forty-
five justices. Seventeen justices responded.
209. See infra Appendix A and accompanying text.
210. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
211. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
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should be curtailed. 212 Forty-one percent opposed curtailing the
appellate division's jurisdiction. 213 Some of the justices com-
mented on this question. 214 Eight justices advocated that inter-
locutory appeals should be granted only upon permission by the
appellate division. 215 One justice suggested limiting appeals
only to summary judgment, while eliminating appeals from dis-
covery type orders. 216 Another justice suggested that the New
York Constitution should be amended to require the appellate
term 2 17 to hear interlocutory appeals. Thereafter, leave to ap-
peal should be required for a further appeal to the appellate di-
vision.218 Another justice suggested allowing review by a single
justice, similar to applications for leave to appeal from Criminal
Procedure Law Article 440 motions. 219
The third question was whether the justice supported in-
creasing the appellate division's reviewability on final judg-
ments and orders, while decreasing the interlocutory orders
that are appealable as of right.220 Twenty-nine percent sup-
ported such a proposal, while sixty-five percent opposed increas-
212. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
213. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
214. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
215. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
216. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
217. The appellate division in each judicial department may establish an ap-
pellate term. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 8. An appellate term's jurisdiction depends on
the appellate division and the legislature. See N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 8(d), (e). At
this time, appellate terms exist in the First and Second Department.
218. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
219. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text. Article 440 motions deal
with collateral attacks on a criminal judgment or a sentence. N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAw §§ 440.10-20 (McKinney 1994). To appeal a denial of a 440 motion, a defend-
ant must seek permission from an appellate division judge. N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW
§ 460.15 (McKinney 1994). See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 450.15 (McKinney 1994) (a
judge in the appellate division may grant permission and certify that a case "in-
volves questions of law or fact which ought to be reviewed by the immediate appel-
late court"). N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 460.15(1) (McKinney 1994). The statute
further states that "[an application for such a certificate must be made in a man-
ner determined by the rules of the appellate division of the department in which
such intermediate appellate court is located." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 460.15(2)
(McKinney 1994). See Appendix C, for the procedures in each appellate division to
apply for a certificate granting leave to appeal.
220. See infra Appendix A and accompanying text.
29
PACE LAW REVIEW
ing reviewability on final judgments and orders. 221 Six percent
did not comment on this question. 222
The fourth question asked whether interlocutory appeals
provide a needed supervision over the trial courts. 2 2 3 Fifty-
three percent of respondents believed that interlocutory appeals
provide a necessary supervision over the trial courts. 224 Forty-
seven percent disagreed, indicating that the broad jurisdiction
over interlocutory appeals does not provide a necessary
supervision. 225
The fifth question was whether allowing numerous interloc-
utory appeals as of right adversely effects the trial court pro-
cess. 2 2 6 Forty-seven percent of respondents believed that under
New York's present system, interlocutory appeals as of right
hinder the trial court process.227 An equal number believed that
interlocutory appeals do not adversely effect the lower courts. 2 2 8
Six percent stated that interlocutory appeals may sometimes
adversely effect the trial court process. 229
The sixth question asked whether interlocutory appeals are
often frivolous and used as a delay tactic.230 Fifty-nine percent
responded in the affirmative, while eighteen percent stated that
they are not used as a delay tactic.231 Twenty-three percent
stated that interlocutory appeals are sometimes used as a delay
tactic.232
The seventh question asked whether 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Part
130233 curtails filing of frivolous interlocutory appeals.234 Sev-
221. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
222. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
223. See infra Appendix A and accompanying text.
224. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
225. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
226. See infra Appendix A and accompanying text.
227. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
228. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
229. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
230. See infra Appendix A and accompanying text.
231. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
232. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
233. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 130 (1986). Section 130(a) allows
"[t]he court, in its discretion, [to award] costs in the form of reimbursement for
actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney's fees, resulting from
frivolous conduct .... [and/or] impose financial sanctions upon any party or attor-
ney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct. . . ." Id. § 130-
1.1(a).
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enty percent stated that 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 130 does not pre-
vent lawyers from filing frivolous interlocutory appeals, while
eighteen percent disagreed.235 Six percent answered that he or
she had not been presented with the issue yet.2 3 6
The eighth question asked what the justice believed would
be the most negative consequence if the appellate division's ju-
risdiction to hear interlocutory appeals was curtailed. 237 The
general consensus expressed the fear that a party may have to
endure an unjust order until he or she appealed the final
judgment.238
The ninth question asked what the justice believed would
be the most beneficial consequence if the appellate division's ju-
risdiction to hear interlocutory appeals was curtailed.239 The
general consensus was that curtailing the number of interlocu-
tory appeals would conserve judicial resources at the appellate
level. 240
The tenth and final question asked if the justice would sup-
port a legislative amendment curtailing the number of interloc-
utory orders appealable by right.241 Forty-seven percent of the
respondents said they would support an amendment, while
thirty-five percent would not. 2 4 2 Six percent were undecided
and twelve percent would support an amendment if it were
drawn carefully. 243
The responses to the questionnaire and the continuing de-
bate over New York's system of interlocutory appeals indicate
that a new approach is needed. The new approach must be effi-
cient in order to allow the appellate division to handle its ever-
increasing caseload. 244 However, the appellate division must be
able to carry out its responsibility of supervising the lower
234. See infra Appendix A and accompanying text.
235. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
236. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
237. See infra Appendix A and accompanying text.
238. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
239. See infra Appendix A and accompanying text.
240. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
241. See infra Appendix A and accompanying text.
242. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
243. See infra Appendix B and accompanying text.
244. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 1.
1996] 637
31
638 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:607
courts to ensure that parties do not suffer through an unjust
order.245
VI. An Evaluation of the Options to Streamline New York's
Approach to Interlocutory Appeals
The legislature must ensure that the appellate division is
able to provide adequate appellate justice for litigants. 2 4 6 Be-
cause of the increase in filing of appeals, especially in the Sec-
ond Department, various committees and commentators have
suggested ways in which the legislature can alleviate the bur-
den on the appellate division. 2 4 7 Suggestions include long-term
major structural changes, 248 minor changes, 249 and moderate
changes. 250
Curtailing the jurisdiction of the appellate division over in-
terlocutory appeals will not solve the ongoing burden of the ap-
pellate division. However, alterations to the present system
could streamline the appellate process for the better. The fol-
lowing are various options which the legislature could employ to
streamline the interlocutory review system in New York.
245. See Botler, supra note 3, at 954-55.
246. If the appellate division believes that existing procedures are detrimen-
tal to the appellate process, it "may make a direct appeal to the legislature for a
change in the law." See James D. Hopkins, The Role of an Intermediate Appellate
Court, 41 BROOK. L. REV. 459, 464 (1975) [hereinafter Hopkins]. Hopkins states
that the appellate division's influence is most persuasive in the area of procedural
law. See id. at 465. He reasons that "[tihe intermediate court is closer to the trial
court; it reviews the procedural aspects of litigation more often and with greater
influence than does the highest court; and it therefore deals in these areas with
larger concern for the efficiency and justice of the process in disposing of cases."
Id. In addition, Hopkins states that the appellate division may "make a direct
statement to the highest court in support of a change in existing doctrine." Id.
Finally, Hopkins evaluates certain factors which determine the potential success
of the appellate division's plea for change. See id. at 466.
247. See supra notes 167-68, 179-189, 190-202 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 180-184 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the
creation of a Fifth Department.
249. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the
proposal to add more justices to the Second Department and continue the Interde-
partmental Case Transfer Plan.
250. See supra notes 185-198 and accompanying text, for a discussion of pro-
posals to limit the number of interlocutory appeals. See also supra text accompany-
ing note 168, for a proposal to reduce the panel of justices to three.
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A. Adopting the Federal Approach
The legislature could adopt the federal system's current ap-
proach to interlocutory appeals.25 ' Adopting the federal ap-
proach would drastically alter New York's treatment of
interlocutory appeals.
One advantage is that the appellate division could use fed-
eral case law for guidance. Another advantage is that judicial
economy would be promoted because the court would only have
to deal with a limited number of interlocutory matters. In addi-
tion, confusion regarding appealability would be reduced be-
cause the federal system has explicitly established which
matters are appealable at the pre-trial stage. 252
One disadvantage is that the federal system has its own
inherent problems. 253 Another disadvantage is that the appel-
late division would lose its ability to supervise the lower courts
on many matters at the pre-trial stage. Because the circuit
courts have a different role than the appellate division, a drastic
limitation on the jurisdiction of the appellate division would be
inconsistent with legislative intent. The legislature created the
appellate division with the intent that it have broad power over
the lower courts. 254 In contrast, the circuit courts were not cre-
ated with such broad power to supervise the district courts.255
Broad review of interlocutory appeals is an effective tool to
supervise the lower courts and is consistent with legislative in-
251. See supra part III.A.
252. But see 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3909 (1992) [hereinafter WRIGHT],
for a discussion of the difficulty in determining what is a final decision.
253. Id. See also supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text, for a discussion
of Congress' departure from the final judgment rule in recent times.
254. See supra note 9, for a brief discussion of the legislative intent behind the
creation of the appellate division. See also Botler, supra note 3, at 940-44. See also
Bergan, supra note 3.
255. See 13 WRIGHT, supra note 252, at § 3504, for a discussion of the creation
of the Circuit Court of Appeals. The circuit courts supervise the district courts
more through the "law of the circuit" rule as opposed to interlocutory review. See
Botler, supra note 3, at 1003-04. Essentially, the "law of the circuit" rule "binds
the district courts to the decisions of their particular circuit courts." Id.
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tent.2 5 6 Therefore, adopting the federal approach would be in-
appropriate in New York.
B. More Emphasis on Permission
The concept of permission, when dealing with interlocutory
appeals, has received endorsement. 2 5 7 By focusing more on per-
mission, the legislature increases the appellate division's dis-
cretion to decide which orders should be appealed immediately.
The legislature has two options when further developing the
permission concept.
First, the legislature could add more orders to CPLR
5701(b), which enumerates the orders appealable by permission
only. 2 58 The legislature could create a task force comprised of
various appellate division justices to determine which addi-
tional orders should be added. 259 The justices could rely on per-
sonal experience to decide which orders are consistently used as
delay tactics, or do not warrant immediate review.
Second, the legislature could eliminate the catch-all provi-
sions of "involves some part of the merits" and "affects a sub-
stantial right." 260 The legislature could then retain the other
five provisions. 261 With regard to all other interlocutory orders,
a party would be required to seek permission from either the
trial judge or an appellate division justice before he or she could
have his or her order appealed immediately.
The legislature could look to various states and the ABA
proposal262 for help in devising a standard for granting permis-
256. See Botler, supra note 3, at 954. "[F]ree appealability affords the Appel-
late Division substantial opportunity to supervise the trial court and to ensure
that its actions are within permissible legal and discretionary bounds." Id.
257. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. In the questionnaire sent by
this author, of the justices who supported curtailing the appellate division's juris-
diction over interlocutory appeals, eight justices supported the concept of permis-
sion. See supra text accompanying note 215. See supra part III.C, for the use of
the permission concept in various states and the federal court.
258. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text, for a list of the three or-
ders which require permission.
259. See Hopkins, supra note 246, at 465. The appellate division is in the best
position to decide procedural changes in the law. See id.
260. See supra part II.B.2. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text, for
committee proposal made in 1958.
261. See supra part II.B.1.
262. See supra text accompanying note 143.
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sion. 2 6 3 In any event, the standard should be specific and clear
to reduce any confusion regarding appealability.
Adding orders to the permission list would be consistent
with the intent of the drafters of CPLR 5701.264 Another advan-
tage is that lawyers and judges would have a clear standard as
to what is appealable by right and what requires permission.
Finally, instead of allowing almost every interlocutory order to
be appealed, the legislature would increase the appellate divi-
sion's discretion to decide what should be reviewed
immediately.
A potential disadvantage is that the trial court or the ap-
pellate division could be flooded with petitions for review. 265
This is avoidable with a specific and clear standard for granting
permission. In addition, developing case law will guide lawyers
in determining appealability.
The advantage of the second proposal is that the appellate
division can utilize its experience when deciding appealability.
In addition, the appellate division could reduce any frivolous
appeals and thereby conserve judicial economy. A disadvantage
to the second proposal is that the trial court or the appellate
division could be flooded with petitions. In addition, judges may
inconsistently grant or deny certification to appeal.
C. Review by a Single Justice Similar to Applications for
Leave to Appeal from CPL Article 440 Motions
In a response to the questionnaire sent by this author, one
justice suggested using Criminal Procedure Law Article 440 as
a model in seeking leave to appeal.266 Essentially, this proce-
dure would create a permission statute for dealing with inter-
locutory appeals. This is a good suggestion because the
legislature could adopt a familiar procedure. 267 The permission
statute could read as such:
CERTIFICATE GRANTING LEAVE TO APPEAL TO INTERMEDIATE APPEL-
LATE COURT
263. See supra part III.C.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
265. See STERN, supra note 141, at 89.
266. See supra text accompanying note 219.
267. See N.Y. CRIM. Paoc. § 460.15 (McKinney 1994).
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1. A certificate granting leave to appeal to an intermediate appel-
late court is an order of one judge or justice of the intermediate
appellate court to which the appeal is sought to be taken grant-
ing such permission and certifying that the case involves ques-
tions of law or fact which ought to be reviewed by the
intermediate appellate court.
2. An application for such a certificate must be made in a manner
determined by the rules of the appellate division of the depart-
ment where such intermediate appellate court is located. 268
Then, the legislature could require each department to
adopt rules expressed in either the First or Second Depart-
ment. 2 6 9 For example, the rule to apply for certification grant-
ing leave to appeal could read as such:
1) Application for a certificate granting leave to appeal to this
court shall be made, in writing, within 30 days after service of
the order upon the applicant, shall give 15 days' notice to the
[respondent], shall be filed with proof of service and shall be
submitted without oral argument.
2) The moving papers for a certificate granting leave to appeal
shall be addressed to the court for assignment to a justice, and
shall state:
(i) the return day; (ii) the name and address of the party seek-
ing leave to appeal and the name of the [respondent]; and
(iii) the question of law and fact which ought to be reviewed.
3) The moving papers must include:
(i) a copy of the order sought to be reviewed; . . . and [(ii) a
brief in support of granting certification.]
4) Answering papers . .. shall be served and filed not later than
noon of the third day before the return date stated in the appli-
cation. Answering papers shall discuss the merits of the appli-
cation . . . .270
The advantage to this proposal would be that every inter-
locutory order would be potentially appealable. Another advan-
tage would be assured review by one justice. In addition, the
pre-trial process would proceed more efficiently to trial.
268. Id.
269. See infra Appendix C, for procedures in each appellate division to apply
for a certificate granting leave to appeal from a denial of a 440 motion.
270. The author has taken language from N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
22, § 600.8(d) (1994) to construct this rule. See infra Appendix C.
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The disadvantage would be that much discretion would be
put in the hands of one justice. In addition, certain orders
which should be appealable by right 271 may be denied certifica-
tion. Therefore, this suggestion may be more appropriate if the
legislature enumerated four or five orders that would be appeal-
able by right and then used the above procedure to grant per-
mission for all other orders.
D. Single Justice Review
Another option is the "single justice" approach used in Mas-
sachusetts. 272 This would be a good compromise between New
York's current system and the federal system.273 Each justice in
the appellate division would be required to take his or her turn
to sit as the single justice. 274 Under the "single justice" ap-
proach, a party would be able to petition an appellate judge for
relief from any interlocutory order. 275 The judge would then
have to consider the petition and he or she would have the same
power as a full bench.276
The advantage to this proposal is that the appellate divi-
sion would conserve judicial resources because it would need
only one justice to decide the interlocutory appeal. Another ad-
vantage is that the trial process would proceed with less de-
lay. 2 7 7 In addition, litigants would always have some appellate
review of every pre-trial matter. Although in most cases it
would only be reviewed before one appellate judge, litigants
would still be assured of some appellate review. Finally, due to
the informal requirements of "single justice review," less time
and money would be spent on intermediate appeals. 278
The disadvantage of this proposal is that litigants would
not have review before a full bench in most cases. Another dis-
271. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the pro-
visional remedies.
272. See supra part III.B.
273. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 125-28, for a discussion of the infor-
mal requirement for "single justice" review.
278. Id.
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advantage is that inconsistent relief could result from the in-
creased discretion of the judge.
VII. Suggestion
A modified "single justice" approach would accommodate
the appropriate balance between supervising the lower court
while conserving judicial resources. First, the legislature could
enumerate five or six specific interlocutory orders that are ap-
pealable as of right to the full bench of the appellate division.279
These orders that are appealable by right must be so important
that immediate appellate review is essential to determine
whether the trial court acted appropriately. Examples could be
the provisional remedies,28 0 where a party may suffer great
hardship before an appellate court determines if the trial court
acted appropriately.
After the legislature enumerated those orders that would
be appealable by right to a full bench, a party would be able to
petition to the single justice for review of all other interlocutory
orders. 281 The single justice would have the same power as the
full bench to grant and deny relief.28 2
Under this proposal, the appellate division could effectively
supervise the lower court because essentially every interlocu-
tory order would be either appealable to a full bench or re-
viewed before a single judge.283 Further, the appellate
division's resources would be conserved considerably, because it
would not have to provide plenary appellate review for every
interlocutory order.
Also, parties would save time and money on preparation for
an appeal. 284 In addition, parties would be assured of an imme-
diate appeal of orders which involve a preliminary injunction,
attachment, or notice of pendency. Finally, litigants would get
279. See supra part II.B.1, for a list of the potential orders that could be ap-
pealable by right.
280. See supra notes 40-44.
281. See supra part III.B.
282. See id.
283. Henn, Single Justice, supra note 115, at 10.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 125-28, for a discussion of the infor-
mal requirements of "single justice" review.
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to trial more swiftly, because it would take less time to decide
the appeal.
VIII. Conclusion
In 1958, the drafters of the CPLR proposed to reduce the
number of interlocutory orders that can be appealed by right.285
Despite the modification of the proposal, the drafters success-
fully introduced the concept of permission. 286 Since the legisla-
ture enacted the CPLR, continuing debate has existed over
whether New York should allow such generous interlocutory
appellate review as a matter of right.28 7 Studies and surveys
indicate that interlocutory appeals are a burden on the appel-
late division.288
Currently, the appellate division is overwhelmed with
cases; consequently, New York must streamline its appellate
system in order to provide a high quality of appellate justice.28 9
Streamlining the state's approach to interlocutory appeals is
one way to conserve judicial resources at the appellate level.
The legislature has many options that would make the system
more efficient but would still allow the appellate division to ef-
fectively supervise the lower courts. 290 Before it is too late, the
legislature should implement one of these options.
David Scheffel*
285. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 117.
286. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 143.
287. WEINSTEIN, supra note 27, ¶ 5701.03. See also Botler, supra note 3. See
also MACCRATE, supra note 6, at 87.
288. Botler, supra note 3, at 992. See also MACCRATE, supra note 6, at 129.
289. TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 1.
290. See supra part VI.
* J.D., Pace University School of Law, 1996. I dedicate this article to my Mom
and Dad. Without their love and support, I would accomplish so little.
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Appendix A-Questionnaire to the Appellate
Division JusticeS291
1. How many years have you served in the appellate division?
2. Should the jurisdiction of the appellate division to hear in-
terlocutory appeals be curtailed?
Yes No
If yes, do you agree with a) allow only a select few by statute; b)
allow only upon permission by the appellate division; or c) limit
altogether.
Comments or Reasons for Response
3. Would you support increasing the appellate division's re-
viewability on final judgments and orders, while decreasing the
interlocutory orders that are appealable as of right?
Yes No
4. Do you believe that interlocutory appeals provide a needed
supervision over the trial courts?
Yes No
5. Do you believe that allowing numerous interlocutory ap-
peals as of right adversely effects the trial court process?
Yes No
6. Do you believe that interlocutory appeals are often frivolous
and used as a delay tactic?
Yes No
7. Do you believe that 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 130 (sanctions) cur-
tails filing of frivolous interlocutory appeals?
Yes No
8. What do you believe would be the most negative conse-
quence, if the appellate division's jurisdiction to hear interlocu-
tory appeals was curtailed?
9. What do you believe would be the most beneficial conse-
quence, if the appellate division's jurisdiction to hear interlocu-
tory appeals was curtailed?
291. The following questionnaire was sent to forty-five justices of the
appellate division. The justice's responses were anonymous. Seventeen justices
responded.
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10. Would you support a legislative amendment curtailing the
number of interlocutory orders appealable as of right?
Yes No
Please feel free to mention any comments or concerns
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Appendix B-Responses to Questionnaire
1. How many years have you served in the appellate division?
The average time served was eleven years.
2. Should the jurisdiction of the appellate division to hear in-
terlocutory appeals be curtailed?
Yes No
If Yes, do you agree with a) allow only a select few by statute; b)
allow only upon permission by the appellate division; or c) limit
altogether.
Comments or Reasons for Response
Some of the comments were:
One justice, who supported allowing only a select number of ap-
peals by statute, stated "I would limit interlocutory appeals to
summary judgment motions and the like but I would eliminate
appeals from discovery motions and the like."
Many of the justices, who supported allowing interlocutory ap-
peals only upon permission, stated:
"This proposed limitation would not affect interlocutory appeals
that have merit- leave to appeal, in such cases, would not be
unreasonably denied."
"Interlocutory appeals are taken frequently from the denial of
summary judgment and from discovery orders. A rather high
percentage of these appeals are frivolous or result in affir-
mances. A permissive procedure would enable the court to cull
those appeals that are frivolous or that clearly do not show an
abuse of discretion that would impair the right to a fair trial."
"Permission should be sought to appeal a denial of a motion for
summary judgment. [However], appeals as of right [should be
allowed] from orders granting summary judgment."
"The appellate division is in the best position to decide which
interlocutory orders should be reviewed."
"The constitution should be amended to require that interlocu-
tory appeals be taken to the Appellate Term; thereafter, leave
to appeal should be required for a further appeal to the appel-
late division."
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"I would provide for review by a single justice, similar to appli-
cations for leave to appeal from CPL art. 440 motions. This
would permit appropriate appeals to be heard."
3. Would you support increasing the appellate division's re-
viewability on final judgments and orders, while decreasing the
interlocutory orders that are appealable as of right?
Yes No
The responses were:
"The appellate division's reviewability of final judgments/orders
need not be increased."
"Our reviewability of final judgments is complete and
adequate."
4. Do you believe that interlocutory appeals provide a needed
supervision over the trial courts?
Yes No
The responses were:
"Only in rare instances."
"Only to a limited extent."
"Yes but too much burden on the appellate division."
5. Do you believe that allowing numerous interlocutory ap-
peals as of right adversely effects the trial court process?
Yes No
The responses were:
"It sometimes does."
"It delays trials."
"Somewhat because trial courts wrongfully believe that there is
an automatic stay."
6. Do you believe that interlocutory appeals are often frivolous
and used as a delay tactic?
Yes No
The responses were:
"Often but not always."
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"I do not dispute that the filing of such an appeal is to seek a
tactical advantage such as a stay."
Two justice responded "Sometimes" and another justice stated
"Occasionally."
7. Do you believe that 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 130 (sanctions) cur-
tails filing of frivolous interlocutory appeals?
Yes No
The responses were:
"Not adequately."
"Not enforced often enough."
"Not yet, but in time it should have such effect."
8. What do you believe would be the most negative conse-
quence, if the appellate division's jurisdiction to hear interlocu-
tory appeals was curtailed?
The comments varied: "None"; "An occasional meritorious
meaningful appeal might not reach the appellate level"; "The
grant of summary judgment would be a thing of the past"; "The
appellate division would not be fulfilling its role"; "No negative
consequence"; "In certain categories of cases, the cost of litiga-
tion would be increased"; "Lawyers might complain"; "Cases un-
necessarily tried which should have been disposed of at an
earlier stage- summary judgment"; "Orders effecting an unjust
result would be allowed to stand pending appeal"; "It would lead
to more reversals after trial"; "Perhaps some cases might be set-
tled inappropriately"; "Delay in resolving procedural issues";
"The trial of many cases that should not be tried"; "Check on
unbridled power of trial court".
9. What do you believe would be the most beneficial conse-
quence, if the appellate division's jurisdiction to hear interlocu-
tory appeals was curtailed?
The comments varied: "Faster resolution of trials and more
cases settled"; "Disposition of cases would improve"; "Our
caseload would be lightened but at a tremendous cost"; "Less
appeals for the appellate division"; "The increase in depth anal-
ysis of meritorious appeals"; "Conservation of judicial resources
at appellate level"; "Trials would proceed and we could hear ap-
peals from judgments"; "Speedier processing to completion at
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trial and hearing levels"; "Fewer appeals"; "Interlocutory ap-
peals designed to achieve delay or perpetuate an unfair result
might be avoided"; "If the appeal initially was to the Appellate
Term, we would eliminate the inordinate delay"; "We would
have more time to devote to significant matters"; "Time saved";
"Appellate calendars would be reduced"; "Frees up court time
for other matters".
10. Would you support a legislative amendment curtailing the
number of interlocutory orders appealable as of right?
Yes No
Please feel free to mention any comments or concerns
Some of the comments were "I would 'favor', but not 'support';
"Probably not. It would have to be very carefully circumscribed";
"We do not favor appeals from denials of summary judgment
and discovery orders and have advised the bar of [such] fact.
Delay can be monitored by denials of stays."
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Appendix C-Application for Certificate Granting Leave
to Appeal
First Department
1) Application for a certificate granting leave to appeal to this
court shall be made, in writing, within 30 days after service of
the order upon the applicant, shall give 15 days' notice to the
district attorney, shall be filed with proof of service and shall be
submitted without oral argument.
2) The moving papers for a certificate granting leave to appeal
shall be addressed to the court for assignment to a justice, and
shall state:
(i) the return day; (ii) the name and address of the party seeking
leave to appeal and the name of the district attorney; (iii) the
indictment number; (iv) the questions of law and fact which
ought to be reviewed; and (v) that no prior application for such
certificate has been made.
3) The moving papers must include:
(i) a copy of the order sought to be reviewed; and (ii) a copy of
the memorandum of opinion of the court below or a statement
that there was none.
4) Answering papers or a statement that there is no opposition
to the application shall be served and filed not later than noon
of the third day before the return date stated in the application.
Answering papers shall discuss the merits of the application, or
shall state:
(i) that the file has been reviewed and includes a response by
the district attorney covering the matters raised in the paper
submitted by the applicant in the court below and an opinion or
memorandum of the justice of that court; and (ii) that the appli-
cation for a certificate granting leave to appeal does not contain
any new allegations.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 600.8(d) (1994).
Second Department
(B)(1) An application pursuant to CPL 450.15 and CPL 460.15
for leave to appeal to this court from an order shall be made in
writing within 30 days after service of the order upon the appli-
cant, on 15 days' notice to the district attorney, or other prose-
cutor, as the case may be.
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(2) The application shall be addressed to the court for assign-
ment to a justice and shall include:
(i) the name and address of the applicant and the name and
address of the district attorney or other prosecutor, as the case
may be; (ii) the indictment, or superior court information
number; (iii) the questions of law or fact which it is claimed
ought to be reviewed; (iv) any other information, data, or matter
which the applicant may deem pertinent in support of the appli-
cation; (v) a statement that no prior application for such certifi-
cate has been made: and (vi) a copy of the order sought to be
reviewed and a copy of the decision of the court of original in-
stance or a statement that there was no decision.
(3) Within 15 days after service of a copy of the application the
district attorney or other prosecutor shall file answering papers
or a statement that there is no opposition to the application.
Such answering papers shall include a discussion of the merits
of the application or shall state, if such be the case, that the
application does not contain any allegations other than those
alleged in the papers submitted by the applicant in the trial
court and that the prosecutor relies on the record; the answer-
ing papers in the trial court; and the decision of such court, if
any.
(4) Unless the justice designated to determine the application
shall otherwise direct, the matter shall be submitted and deter-
mined upon the foregoing papers and without oral argument.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 670(b)1-4 (1994).
Third Department
An application to a justice of the appellate division for leave to
appeal in a civil case (CPLR 5701(c)), or in a criminal action or
proceeding (CPL 460.15; CPL 460.20), may, but need not be, ad-
dressed to a named justice, and, unless otherwise directed by
order to show cause, shall be made returnable at the court's ad-
dress in Albany, in the manner provided in section 800.2(a) of
this Part. Such an application may not be argued unless the
justice to whom it is made or referred otherwise directs.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 800.3 (1994).
Fourth Department
An application for a certification for a certificate granting leave
to appeal to the appellate division pursuant to CPL 460.15(2)
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shall be made to the court and shall be assigned to an individ-
ual justice thereof.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1000.3 (1994).
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